## On Polynomial Approximations for Privacy-Preserving and Verifiable ReLU Networks

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## Introduction

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- While there are many efficient privacy-preserving and verifiable techniques for polynomial-based computations [1-4], neural networks involve non-polynomial computations.
- Hence, several frameworks as CryptoNets [5] and SafetyNets [6] replace the nonpolynomial functions with polynomial functions.

#### **Previous Work**

• Much previous works as [5, 6] replace the ReLU function

 $\sigma_{\rm r}(x) = \max(x, 0)$ 

with the square function

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- Rationale [5]: "the lowest-degree non-linear polynomial function"
- Max-pooling layers also are replaced with sum-pooling layers.
- This was shown empirically to work well for networks with small number of activation layers (3 or 4 layers).

#### This Work

- We empirically show that  $\sigma_{\text{square}}(x) = x^2$  does not work well for deeper networks.
- We instead propose

$$\sigma_{\rm poly}(x) = x^2 + x.$$

•  $\sigma_{
m poly}$  improves the test accuracy by up to 9.4 % compared to  $\sigma_{
m square}$ .

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- 4. What about large intervals I = [-a, a]?
  - Use Minimax approximation and round the coefficients.
  - This polynomial is given by

$$\sigma_{\rm poly}(x) = x^2 + ax.$$



#### **Evaluation**

1. We consider the convolutional network of [7].

The network has

- 7 convolutional layers
- 7 ReLU activation layers
- 2 max-pooling layers
- a fully connected layer and
- a Softmax activation layer.

#### Test Accuracy

Activation	CIFAR-10	CIFAR-100
CNN-ReLU	84.6%	54.7%
<b>CNN-Poly</b>	83.0%	55.3%
<b>CNN-Quad</b>	77.4%	51.3%

#### **Evaluation**

2. We consider the "Network In Network" architecture of [8].

The network has

- 9 convolutional layers
- 9 ReLU activation layers
- 2 max-pooling layers, Global pooling layer and
- a Softmax activation layer.

#### Test Accuracy

Activation	CIFAR-10	CIFAR-100
NIN-ReLU	88.5%	64.2%
NIN-Poly	88.7%	55.4%
NIN-Quad	81.0%	46.0%

### Discussion

- We have that empirically shown that  $\sigma_{\text{poly}}(x) = x^2 + x$  significantly outperforms  $\sigma_{\text{square}}(x) = x^2$ .
- Our future work aims to test our activation function on deeper networks and other datasets and to investigate its optimality.

Questions? Thank you

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